Mini Armes Nucléaires
25 février 2003
Transmis par un informateur sous le pseudonyme
d'Esculape.
Les Etats-Unis mettent au point une mini-arme atomique
http://www.investigateur.ms/USAminibombeatomique.htm
A LIRE EGALEMENT : An Agenda for the Nuclear Weapons Program.
Les Etats-Unis mettent au point une mini-arme atomique Un document secret du
Pentagone (lire le document ci-dessous) en témoigne : les Etats-Unis
sont en train de mettre au point une nouvelle génération d'armes
nucléaires miniatures conçues pour l'usage dans la guerre conventionnelle.
Cela signifierait également l'abandon des traités de non-prolifération.
Le document, qui est tombé entre les mains du Groupe d'étude
de Los Alamos, un groupe de " sentinelles " spécialisés
dans les armes nucléaires basé aux
USA, décrit des plans pour une réunion des fonctionnaires militaires
aînés et des scientifiques nucléaires à la commande
stratégique des USA à Omaha,
Nébraska, pendant la semaine de 4 août. Nous reproduisons ici ces
documents qui n'ont jamais été publiés. La réunion
aurait traité du développement ultérieur des essais pour
mettre au point d'armes nucléaires à utilisation tactique et locale.
Ces armes, d'une puissance destructive de moins de cinq kilotones, ont pu être
conçues
pour pénétrer une soute souterraine avant explosion. La bombe
d'Hiroshima lâchée par les USA dans 1945 a eu un rendement d'environ
15 kilotons. Ces bombes serviraient à détruire les bunkers creusés
par les hommes de Saddam mais pourraient aussi servir contre tous ceux qui pensent
que d'enterrer leurs armes pourrait les préserver. Les militaires des
USA pensent que la mini-arme nucléaire peut fournir une force de dissuasion
susceptible de décourager les états voyous. Les spéciaslistes
américains auraient déjà tranché pour utiliser ces
mini-bombes plutôt que les armes nucléaires standard, qui ont des
rendements de centaines de kilotons et dont l'utilisation pose de graves problèmes
de gestion politique en même temps que des questions non résolues
de pollution. Les fonctionnaires de gouvernement des USA ont confirmé
l'authenticité du document que nous publions, mais déclarent qu'il
couvre "la planification de gamme très longue" et "n'est
qu'un scénario envisagé parmi d'autres". Pas de quoi être
rassuré.
Des bombes à neutrons
En outre, il y aurait également à l'ordre du jour pour août
la réunion l'utilisation de bombe à neutrosn. Celles-ci produisent
une grande quantité de rayonnement sans souffle dévastateur et
peuvent être employées pour décimer des réserves
et des troupes d'armes sans détruire l'infrastructure. Les " sentinelles
" pensent que le document est extrêmement alarmant. Patrick Garrett,
un analyste de GlobalSecurity.org, a déclaré que cela reviendrait
à réactiver la guerre froide. Le fait que ces personnes s'asseoir
pour parler de telles armes, de leurs essais, de leurs productions et de leurs
inconvénients signifie que l'hypothèse de leur utilisation est
sérieusement envisagéeces personnes et que le déploiement
de telles armes est très proche. . Garrett ajoute que les conséquences
de l'arme à neutrons ou des mini-bombes nucléaires n'est pas connu.
Menace sur les Traités de non-prolifération
Le Groupe d'étude de Los Alamos a ajouté qu'il était grave
d'ainsi rendre caduque les accords internationaux de non-prolifération.
Quelle légitimité
auraient en effet les Etats-Unis pour donner des leçons à Saddam,
à la Corée du Nord s'ils sont les premiers à violer les
accords. Greg Mello, dirigent
des sentinelles de Los Alamos a indiqué : " Ces traités de
non-prolifération s'appliquent aux Etats-Unis aussi " L'intérêt
récent des Etats-Unis pour les mini-bombes nucléaires date de
l'an 2000. Un document secret rapporte qu'en octobre 2000 que des crédits
de la défense américaine ont payé une étude de la
praticabilité de mini-armes nucléaires et ceci en contradiction
avec l'interdiction de recherche dans le domaine du développement des
armes nucléaires de champ de bataille imposées
en 1993. En novembre 2002, le New Scientific a également dévoilé
qu'une autre ligne budgétaire de $15 millions de dolalrs avait été
affecté à la recherche pour
mettre au point une bombe perforante nucléire capable de détruire
des bunkers enterrés et désignée sous le nom de code Robust
Nuclear Earth Penetrator. Le document secret du Pentagone traitant de mini-bombes
nucléaires Stockpile Stewardship Conference Planning Meeting Minutes
10 January 2003 Pentagon, Room 3C912 0930-1200
Au Pentagone, l'utilisation du nucléaire est désormais envisagée.
Le commandement américain étudie l'abaissement du seuil d'utilisation
de
l'arme atomique. L'Irak pourrait en être le premier champ d'application
(Los Angeles Times)
Les États-Unis envisagent l'impensable: ils se préparent au possible
recours à l'arme nucléaire contre l'Irak. Dans les coulisses du
Commandement stratégique américain (STRATCOM), basé à
Omaha [Nebraska], comme dans les cellules de planification de l'état-major
interarmes, on épluche les listes d'objectifs, soupèse les options
et révise les procédures, afin d'accorder aux armes nucléaires
un rôle dans la nouvelle doctrine américaine de la "prévention".
Pour l'heure, la réflexion se concentre sur deux usages possibles des
armes atomiques: pour attaquer les installations irakiennes si profondément
enterrées qu'elles pourraient résister aux explosifs
conventionnels pour empêcher l'Irak d'utiliser des armes de destruction
massive. Au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme, ces mesures bouleversent lles
règles fondamentales de l'engagement nucléaire. Il est inquiétant,
pour au moins trois raisons, de voir les États-Unis abaisser le seuil
d'utilisation du nucléaire et faire ainsi disparaître ce qui distinguait
les. D'abord, que Washington abaisse ainsi ce seuil, ou envisage seulement de
le faire, accroît le risque de voir d'autres pays agir de même.
Lesquels pourraient utiliser l'arme nucléaire dans des situations où
ils auraient en
fait simplement besoin d'une force de frappe plus importante. [En fait, les
États du "Club nucléaire" possèdent des armes
nucléaires tactiques (ANT) développées pour être
éventuellement utilisées au niveau du champ de bataille.] De plus,
cette idée que les armes nucléaires ne seraient qu'une option
parmi d'autres arrive à un moment où la technologie permet d'opter
pour des solutions différentes, et meilleures. L'armée américaine
est de plus en plus capable de neutraliser les bases souterraines ou de détruire
les armes chimiques et biologiques sans ouvrir la boîte de Pandore atomique,
par la combinaison d'une puissance aérienne ultramoderne, d'opérations
spéciales et de capacités du XXIème siècle telles
que les armes à micro-ondes de forte puissance et la cyberguerre. Enfin,
on court le danger de laisser le soin d'une révision de la politique
nucléaire à un seul commandement militaire, le STRATCOM, qui avait
jusque-là pour mission de gérer les questions stratégiques,
et non politiques, liées au
recours à l'arme atomique. Ce commandement jouit d'une expérience
sans égale dans le domaine de l'emploi et des effets de ces armes, mais
cette expertise
ne s'étend pas aux raisons pouvant entraîner leur mise en ouvre.
Le ministre de la Défense, Donald Rumsfeld, a tendance à confier
les grandes refontes de doctrine politique a des organisations secrètes
étroitement contrôlées au sein du Pentagone. Cette habitude
permet de contourner toute opposition, qui, dans les forces armées, est
souvent le fait de ceux qui ont une expérience approfondie de ces questions.
Pour l'instant, cette redéfinition de l'emploi du nucléaire est
l'objet de travaux au quartier général du STRATCOM, ainsi que
dans de petites équipes a Washington et dans un des "lieux tenus
secrets" où se cache le vice-président Dick Cheney [pour
raisons de sécurité], quelque part en Pennsylvanie. Le commandement,
qui était seulement responsable des armes atomiques, a vu ses missions
se multiplier. Bush vient d'approuver un mémorandum adressé par
Rumsfeld demandant à ce que le commandant en chef du STRATCOM se voit
accorder la charge de tout l'éventail des options "stratégiques"
dans la lutte contre les États et les organisations terroristes. Ce qui
couvre en fait des taches très diverses et regroupe ainsi sous la férule
des spécialistes militaires du nucléaire aussi bien le recours
à l'arme atomique que les frappes conventionnelles, les opérations
spéciales et clandestines ainsi que le "camouflage stratégique".
William M. Arkin,
L'investigateur
1. Mr. Fred Celec (ATSD(NCB/NM)) opened the meeting on
behalf of Dr. Dale Klein (ATSD(NCB)). A list of attendees is at attachment 1.
2. Mr. Celec began by discussing the background leading to the Stockpile Stewardship
Conference. The genesis of the conference is the October 2002 memo from the
NWC Chairman, Mr. Pete Aldridge (USD(AT&L)), to the NWC on risk in the stockpile
stewardship program; specifically, the risk associated with not testing our
nuclear weapons. Ambassador Linton Brooks (NWC member and Acting Administrator,
NNSA) and General Peter Pace (NWC member and Vice
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) replied to the memo, expressing their support
for the conference and offering comments on its expected content. The scope
of the conference then evolved to include additional topics associated with
the nuclear deterrent in a post-Nuclear Posture Review environment. The Stockpile
Stewardship Conference will be used to present the results of the work of four
panels to the NWC, and others as appropriate, and to establish recommendations
for the way-ahead. Although the conference will consider issues related to nuclear
testing, it is not the policy of the Administration to return to nuclear testing.
3. ACTION: The Executive Committee members agreed to revise the draft purpose
statement. Purpose: In concert with the NPR, evaluate the issues of maintaining
confidence in the nuclear deterrent; evaluate the risks in our current assessment
process and ways to reduce those risks, and the current and
planned infrastructure capacity and capability.
4. The organization of the conference was discussed.
Mr. Aldridge, the NWC Chairman, will chair the conference and Admiral Ellis
(STRATCOM) will host
it. The preparatory work will be performed by four panels. An Executive Committee
(ExCom), chaired by Dr. Dale Klein, will provide oversight, assure
that the work of the panels is in alignment throughout the process, integrate
the finding of the panels, and plan the conference. To assure
alignment of the panels, it was agreed that the ExCom would meet several times
during the process to review the progress of the panels. It was agreed
that the four panel chairs will be part of the ExCom. The members are:
ATSD(NCB) - Dr. Klein, Chairman
STRATCOM - RADM Byrd
Joint Staff - RDML Walsh
OSD (P) - Dr. Payne
NNSA - Dr. Beckner
SAG - Dr. Burnett (advisor)
SSP Strategy & Risk Panel Chair- Brig Gen Haeckel (NNSA)
Future Arsenal Panel Chair - Dr. Hardebeck (STRATCOM)
NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Chair - Mr. Beck (NNSA)
Strategy and Policy Panel Chair - Dr. Maaranen (OSD(P))
5. Mr. Celec provided some guidelines for selection of panel topics and panel
members. Each of the four panels was discussed. The ExCom agreed to a draft
list of topics and member organizations for each of the panels. These are at
Attachment 2. The ExCom agreed that these lists are a starting point and that
the panels should be free to discuss all issues they believe are relevant to
their topical area. Consensus on "the answers" is not always necessary.
There was some discussion regarding the value of a "common participant"
to attend all panel meetings to provide consistency and help avoid duplication.
ACTION: Member organizations are requested to send the names of their organization's
representatives to the panels to Ms. Stoner by January 17, 2003.
6. The ExCom agreed that the Panel Chairs are responsible for developing the
Terms of Reference (TOR) for their panels. The ExCom will not have a separate
TOR, but it will have an over-arching purpose statement. The Panel Chairs are
expected to convene their panels to complete this work and report back to the
ExCom with their TORs. It was agreed that the possibility of holding the next
ExCom meeting in early February would be investigated. ACTION: The Panel Chairs
are to provide the ExCom a TOR for their panel at the next meeting, likely to
be held in early February 2003.
7. ACTION: The ExCom agreed to review the following topics and determine which
panel is most appropriate to address them.
* What should the policy and process be for granting authority to adapt and
build small quantities?
*Evaluate the DoD/NNSA Requirements process. Do we adequately identify requirements,
and their priority in existing systems?
8. The ExCom agreed that the results of the conference should be reviewed by
the NWC and forwarded, as appropriate, to the Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of Energy. There was some discussion regarding the form that the results
will take. It was decided that a decision briefing to frame the issues and provide
a recommendation on the way-ahead would be most useful to the Secretaries. Dr.
Maarenen (OSD(P)) pointed out that if the product of the conference is an actual
decision briefing on proposed DoD policy, this would require considerable coordination
through OSD(P), and would significantly extend the timeline needed for a finalized
conference product. The group agreed that the briefing will provide a recommended
roadmap and offer suggestions on moving to further coordination.
9. Possible dates for the conference, to be held at STRATCOM, were discussed.
It was agreed that the possibility of holding it the week of August 4, 2003,
would be investigated.
List of Attendees
Mr. Beck, NNSA
Dr. Burnett, SAG (Advisor)
Dr. Younger, DTRA
Ms. Montie, DTRA
Dr. Hardebeck, US STRATCOM
RADM Byrd, US STRATCOM
Dr. Immele, LANL
Dr. Goldstone, LANL
Dr. McMillan, LLNL
Dr. Goodwin, LLNL
Dr. Beckner, NNSA
Brig Gen, Haeckel, NNSA
Dr. Maaranen, OSD(P)
Mr. Victory, OSD(P)
Col Blessing, JS
CAPT Sigg, US STRATCOM
Mr. Celec, OSD/AT&L (NM)
Ms. Stoner, OSD/AT&L (NM)
Mr. Steinhoff, OSD/AT&L (NM) (NNSA)
Mr. Hatch, OSD/AT&L (NM)
Dr. Wolkerstorfer, OSD/AT&L (NM)
Mr. Wade, NNSA
Mr. Bentley, SNL/NNSA
Mr. Schoenbauer, NNSA
Col Wilmoth, OSD/AT&L (NM)
Ms Hood, OSD/AT&L (NM)
CAPT Manaskie, JS
Dr. Stichman, SNL
Brig Gen Smolen, AF/XON
Dr. Mullins, AF/XON
Dr. Hannah, Navy SSP
Mr. Williams, OSD(P) Consultant
Invited but did not attend:
RDML Walsh, JS
Dr. Harvey, NNSA
Dr. Payne, OSD(P)
Panels: Draft Topics Lists and Members
SSP Strategy and Risk Panel
Major Topics:
(1) How well do we quantify risk in our current assessment of nuclear weapons
[warheads and those aspects of the delivery systems that impact the
risk associated with the warheads] in the stockpile?
(2) What existing, and new SSP tools coming on-line could provide enhanced capabilities
to quantify and minimize performance risk both for the legacy
stockpile, and potential new or modified weapons?
(a) What are the anticipated limits of the extent to which improved understanding
of weapon physics is basis for confidence?
(b) In consideration of new weapons that might be needed in a post-NPR environment,
are the tools we have the right ones or do we need to develop new tools?
(3) Are there stockpile performance issues that we cannot now or may not in
the future be able to address fully, or for which developing SSP capabilities
are less certain? What are the risk mitigation measures for these existing and
potential gaps in our understanding?
(4) What can we do to strengthen the process for reducing the risk in assessing
the military effectiveness of our current and future stockpile?
(a) What is the overarching strategy for managing risks in the SSP?
(b) Are there alternative (foreign) approaches to managing risks that should
be examined?
(5) What is the role of nuclear testing in reducing risk in the stockpile? What
parts of those risks are associated with the absence of nuclear testing, in
comparison to the risk associated with a 150kt threshold or a low-yield test
program? What is the uncertainty in confidence and potential
risk threshold for a test recommendation---what would demand a test?
(6) Assess the following with regards to the certification infrastructure:
(a) What will be the impact on (5) of the operation of the NIF over the next
5 - 15 years? Similarly, what would be the impact of the operation of AHF in
10 -15 years?
(b) What are the demands on the capabilities and capacities of the Certification
Infrastructure over time?
(c) At what level, over time, can the certification (also R&D assessment)
infrastructure being develop and tested with current deliverables be transferable
and agile for changing priorities?
(7) Do we need to change the rebuild strategy for QART consumed warheads?
(8) Is the current Annual Certification Process sufficient, or does it need
to be modified to take into consideration political considerations regarding
testing?
(9) What are the lessons we've learned since the Stockpile Stewardship Program
began? In the decades when we were testing, tests sometimes revealed surprises.
What have we learned from this? SSP Strategy and Risk Panel Membership
Member Name Organization
Ron Haeckel, Chair NNSA
David Rehbein STRATCOM
Gary Betourne OSD(P)
Dave Crandall NNSA
Bruce Goodwin LLNL
Ray Juzaitis LANL
Doug Henson SNL
Susan Stoner NM
Don Wolkerstorfer NM
Frank Grand DTRA
Rod Miller AF
Mike Maglich Navy
John Birely SAG advisor
Future Arsenal Panel
Major Topics:
(1) What are the warhead characteristics and advanced concepts we will need
in the post-NPR environment?
(a) Establish methodology for making choices
(b) Strategy for selecting first "small builds"
(c) Requirements for low-yield weapons, EPWs, enhanced radiation weapons, agent
defeat weapons
(d) Effects modeling capabilities to effectively plan for these weapons
(e) What forms of testing will these new designs require?
(f) What obvious weaknesses exist in our ability to attack targets and assess
target damage for present and future targets andweapon systems?
(2) How do we link service-provided platform requirements for the arsenal?
(a) What is the testing strategy for weapons more likely to be used in small
strikes?
(b) Does a requirement for higher confidence in small strikes drive larger test
asset inventories?
(c) Hardness and compatibility of conventional and dual use platforms
(i) How do we institutionalize these requirements?
(d) Leverage on existing SAGSAT efforts on dual-use platforms
(e) Reliability requirements
(f) Other requirements (e.g. precision)
(3) Given the size and composition of the operationally deployed stockpile,
are our assumptions correct as we size the stockpile? (Leverage on existing
US STRATCOM and NWC work.)
(a) Reliability replacements
(b) Augmentation quantities
(c) Reserve
(4) Plans for modernization of delivery platforms
(a) Are these plans consistent with the SSP and NMMP?
(b) Is the LEP schedule tuned to DoD needs?
(5) Regarding guidance requirements and assumptions on availability of GPS:
(a) Is GPS, or other advanced systems, available for all plans or just
special cases?
(b) Do we put GPS on all systems, or just a few?
Future Arsenal Panel Membership
Member Name Organization
Ted Hardebeck, Chair US STRATCOM
Pat Stanton OSD(P)
NNSA
Hank O'Brien LLNL
John Immele LANL
Steve Rottler SNL
Steve Hatch NM
Tom Troyano S&TS
George Manaskie JS
Bill Mullins AF
Barry Hannah Navy
Douglas Bruder DTRA
George Miller SAG advisor
NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Panel
[ Note from Fred Celec: As we circulated these draft
minutes to ensure we fairly and accurately captured the discussion, we received
several comments to the effect that the NWC has no legal responsibility for
DOD infrastructure, and therefore the Infrastructure panel was misnamed and
it's proposed work program too broad. Since we had discussed this issue at the
meeting, I felt there was a good understanding within the group that DOD
infrastructure discussions were limited to the DOD infrastructure that directly
supported the SSP in general and the LEPs in particular. That said, I realized
that to the outside reader or observer, the distinction between DOD and NNSA
infrastructure to be examined by the panel was not that clear. We have attempted
to more clearly draw that distinction in order to satisfy the more casual reader.
If upon reading these minutes you feel we have failed to do so, do not hesitate
to contact either myself or Susan Stoner.]
Major Topics
(1) Assess the adequacy and robustness of assessment and planned capability
and capacity at and NNSA design, assessment, test, and production sites and
appropriate DoD facilities. Determine if the NNSA and DoD infrastructures are
agile enough to support a 'small build' strategy. [Panel should look at
DoD infrastructure where it impacts NNSA's ability to do its tasking-flight
testing, ranges, simulators, etc.]
(2) Examine the balance and flexibility between design, research and development,
production, maintenance, and small builds.
(a) What is most stressing task?
(b) Are the required skill sets transferable and agile for changing priorities?
(c) Can we cover plausible unforeseen stockpile emergencies?
(d) What are the tradeoffs between maintenance of production capability/capacity
and the supporting R&D base?
(3) Comment on the success of implementing the Chiles Commission Recommendations
and on the health, experience, and training ofdesign,
engineering, and military staffs.
(4) What recommendations can be made as to how NNSA's SSP and DoD's programs
can be better harmonized?
NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Panel Membership
Member Name Organization
Dave Beck, Chair NNSA
David Rehbein US STRATCOM
Pat Higgins NNSA
Glenn Mara LLNL
Don McCoy LANL
Don Cook SNL
Lew Steinhoff NM
Eric Jackson DTRA
Leonard Zentz Navy
Roberta Carlisle AF
S&TS
Production Complex Reps
Tom Seitz SAG advisor
Strategy and Policy Panel
Major Topics
(1) The contribution of nuclear forces to each of the four principal defense
goals: assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat
(2) The proper relationship of nuclear forces to the non-nuclear strike and
missile defense elements of the Triad
(3) Qualitative differences in nuclear forces that may be needed to implement
the strategy
(4) Policy guidance and policy issues that must be resolved to facilitate the
necessary changes in nuclear forces and infrastructure
(a) Reexamine the policy issues of the various levels of testing. Should the
US adjust its policy on nuclear weapons testing?
(b) How do we frame the explanation of emerging policy to show the deterrent
the value of reduced-collateral damage, precision, agent defeat, and penetrating
nuclear capabilities in meeting our national security objectives?
(c) What should be the policy and process for granting authorities to adapt
and build small quantities?
Strategy and Policy Panel Membership
Member Name Organization
Steve Maaranen, Chair OSD(P)
Frank Dellerman OSD(P)
David Rehbein US STRATCOM
John Harvey NNSA
George Manaskie JS
Donald Minner DTRA
Dan Wilmoth NM
John Immele LANL
Michael Callahan SNL
Ron Lehman LLNL
S&TS
Paul Robinson SAG advisor
____________________________________________
Nombre de consultations depuis le 25 février 2003 :
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